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Abstract 
 
The financialization literature considers the impact of financial markets on corporate strategy, 
governance, financial performance and the distribution of resources between various 
stakeholder groups. Capital market demands modify strategic priorities, governance and 
managerial narratives about performance because this helps justify value creation and value 
absorption in an era of shareholder value. The literature on financialization suggests that 
managers have a tendency to exaggerate performance to boost valuations especially when 
their interests align with those of the firm’s shareholders. In this exploratory study of an 
R&D-intensive firm “Medco” we consider the extent to which managerial narratives and 
corporate governance of this R&D intensive firm reflect a process of financialization.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The established literature on shareholder value and financialization considers the impact of 
the stock markets’ increasing demands for financial returns on corporate behaviour, 
governance and performance (Froud et al, 2002; Andersson et al, 2007). Under 
financialization, the behaviour of firms is modified to create open dynamics and variable 
results distinguished by instability, reversibility and unpredictability (Gleadle & Cornelius, 
2008; Andersson et al, 2008). To date there have been few case studies of management 
control under financialization (see Ezzamel et al, 2008 for an exception) and of the impact of 
financialization on R&D-intensive organizations (Lazonick, 2007). Froud et al (2006), for 
example, construct a case study on the financialization of strategy in the pharmaceutical 
giant, Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK), employing secondary sources rather than original narratives 
relating to issues of internal management control. 
 
The aims of this exploratory case study are to investigate the extent to which an R&D 
intensive firm, Medco, operates within a productionist or financialized framework of 
corporate governance (see Andersson et al, 2008). Our research objectives(s) are to explore 
the narratives and numbers connected with managing and operating this R&D intensive bio-
pharma company. Specifically, to what extent have corporate priorities, management culture 
and governance of this R&D intensive company been modified by the demands of the capital 
market under financialization? 
 
Our research takes a middle ground narratives and numbers approach that respects the self-
interpretations of the social actors interviewed and maintains a rich landscape / universe 
within which to review the relative financial performance of the case study firm, Medco. This 
case study reveals how narratives that constellate around R&D are modified by the demands 
of the capital market. Our analysis of the numbers makes visible the extent to which R&D 
delivers superior corporate financial performance when we compare Medco against all other 
small caps listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Narratives and numbers are 
 counterpoised to construct critical reflections about R&D under financialization where 
connections are not straightforward and outcomes ambiguous.    
 
The paper adopts the following structure. First, we review the academic literature on R&D 
observing that this is located within a ‘productionist’ framework where connections between 
performance, productivity and competitiveness for value creation are constructed. We then 
turn to discuss the method and general approach employed and how this addresses issues, for 
example, identified by Froud et al (2006) and Lazonick (2007). Our third section presents a 
summary of the interviews undertaken at Medco to reveal narratives about corporate 
performance. The fourth section reviews financial performance and considers the extent to 
which governance and stakeholder settlements align with a productionist or financialized 
enterprise. In the discussion and concluding remarks, we argue that notwithstanding Medco’s 
relatively high R&D spend the company emerges as one which is financialized in nature.   
 
2. Literature review  
 
Both government policy documents and the academic literature identify the potential of the 
creative and innovative sectors to transform economic growth and national competitiveness 
(DCMS 1998, 2001, Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, 2004, Prahalad and Hamel,1990). The 
general argument is that investment in innovation can help strengthen corporate financial 
performance and transform industry and national economic competitiveness. Investment in 
knowledge development and commitment to high levels of R&D spending is a key to 
maintaining competitiveness and closing the “innovation gap”. 
 
Investment in research, leading to innovation and productive benefit to the economy, 
is a major concern for governments around the world, and a high priority for the 
European Union. Currently, the EU has considerable strengths, yet invests about a 
third less than the US and the innovation gap has not narrowed in recent years. 
http://www.eirma.org/f3/showthread.php?t=613 
 
An alternative literature reveals how managerial behaviour and culture, corporate 
governance, stakeholder interests, firm performance, national economic competitiveness and 
the distribution of income and wealth are steadily modified by the demands of finance capital 
(Deeg & O’Sullivan 2006; Fligstein 2004; Froud et al, 2006; Rossman & Greenfield, 2006; 
 Stockhammer, 2004). Alternative financialized accounts of R&D, innovation and 
performance engage with the general presupposition that R&D intensive firms are able to 
capture above average economic performance, growth and productivity that in turn reduce 
cost structures to boost profits and cash margins. In the Froud et al (2006) “Glaxo” case 
accounting numbers are employed to reveal limited transformation in corporate financial 
performance, especially in key variables such as profit and return on capital employed (see 
also Andersson et al 2006). Froud et al (2006) explore discrepancies between managerial 
narratives about performance and alternative narrative(s) constructed out of company 
financial statements. Froud et al observe that the tendency of a shareholder value driven 
management culture is to provide flattering narratives about performance and thereby inflate 
capital market valuation and  “talk up the value of the stock”. 
 
More generally, the process of financialization presents a threat to sustaining investment in 
productive and process renewal because financial markets demand value creation and value 
absorption from invested capital. In an era of shareholder value managers are under pressure 
to both create value and absorb value for shareholders (Andersson et al, 2008; Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000). Andersson et al (2007, 2008) reveal that in both the US and Europe firms 
are distributing a higher share of cash resources to shareholders relative to productive capital 
expenditure in product and process renewal. Lazonick and O’ Sullivan (2000) describe, this 
as the strategy of “downsize and distribute” because the priority is to increase the share of 
profit and cash distributed to shareholders rather than to reinvest in product development and 
innovation.   
 
3. Research approach  
 
The aims of this exploratory study are to investigate whether our R&D oriented firm Medco 
operates under a productionist or financialized form of corporate governance in the 
management of its operations and corporate strategy (Andersson et al, 2008). To this end, 
firstly, following Yin (1984) we conduct an exploratory case study of a successful medical 
diagnostics company in the South East. According to Yin (1984:13) 
 
‘Case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.’ 
 Often the goal of an exploratory case is to develop propositions and identify problems for 
further enquiry. To this end, we deliberately interviewed Medco’s commercial director, a 
senior finance professional and three individuals from different levels within the laboratory 
R&D function located within the Lab division based in the South East. This choice of 
interviewees facilitated an exploration of possible tension between commercial and financial 
objectives, and the organization of R&D within Medco.  In order to cross-check our findings, 
we perform some detailed financial analysis using key financial metrics taken from Medco’s 
published accounts covering the 5-year period 2003-2007 when the company had just started 
operations. For the purposes of the current paper, although we are not comparing Medco with 
other bio-pharma, our approach resonates with Lazonick’s (2007:1027) call below: 
 
‘...only in-depth studies at the company level, and ideally ones that are comparative 
among major competitors in an industry, can generate robust conclusions about the 
relation between the functions that the stock market performs in the corporate 
enterprise and the generation of innovative capabilities.’ 
 
Lazonick continues (2007:1028) 
 
‘the analysis of the relation of the stock market to innovative enterprise, therefore, 
must be not only firm-based and comparative; it must be historical as well.’ 
 
In addition to the collection of narrative accounts to build our case study, we have 
constructed a relative financial performance profile of Medco against the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) group of companies. For the latter we construct a financial profile 
of 500 AIM listed firms that have disclosed 5 years of financial data for the period 2003 to 
2007. This group of AIM-listed firms is employed as a reference group against which we can 
compare the performance of Medco. Our financial metrics utilize the nature of expenses 
rather than function of expense approach to profile financial performance. Starting with the 
revenue side, we deconstruct performance to reveal separately how much revenue is 
employed to cover external and then internal costs (such as employee expenses) leaving a 
residual of cash and profit from operations. We then combine this analysis with rates of 
capitalization (debt and equity) employed to generate a unit of cash or profit per unit of 
capital employed (Andersson et al, 2007, 2008). Triangulating these findings with the 
 narratives provided by those interviewed, we construct an exploratory case study of Medco, 
an R&D-intensive business, under conditions of financialization. 
 
4. The case study Medco 
 
4.1. The industry: medical diagnostics 
  
The medical diagnostics industry is a specialized segment of the bio-pharma industry where 
firms are involved in the development of testing equipment and the associated chemical (the 
analyte or marker) which are employed to carry out the assay (the test). For example, a 
sample taken from a patient, such as blood or urine, can be tested with the so-called marker to 
help aid the diagnosis or monitoring of a disease or its treatment. In the case of Medco, one 
major product sold is an analyte that is the biologically active part of the vitamin B12 
molecule, cobalamin, transported in the bloodstream. 
 
According to the Medco website, healthcare finds itself at a crossroads where previously, 
doctors judged it sufficient to treat the symptoms of disease and so there was little need for 
diagnostic testing. Arguably, this has changed with pressure from (healthcare) payers, 
patients and regulators, in favour of treating the causes of disease and so necessitating a high 
need for diagnostic accuracy. It is against this background that the development of diagnostic 
testing equipment has helped to grow new companies such as our case study firm, Medco. 
Diagnostic work (expense), which is subject to increasing regulation, can be re-located at 
least in part outside of the acute hospital into the doctor’s surgery and even into the patient’s 
own home, the so-called point of care (POC). This possibility creates, in turn, a new 
corporate financial opportunity because diagnostic testing modifies the healthcare pathway to 
provide an income stream to diagnostic firms that provide the instrumentation and reagents 
for testing which is paid for by the doctor or patient at home. 
 
The diagnostics industry has also consolidated with for example Siemens taking over DPC 
and Bayer amongst other acquisitions. Medco’s commercial director comments that:   
‘Whilst ten years ago, there was a relatively large number of companies operating in 
the bio-pharma sector, now this number has been reduced not only through mergers 
and acquisitions but also by firms going out of business.’  
 
 Restructuring is commonplace with for example the US firm Abbott Labs, doing so recently 
after a failed takeover attempt by GE. The view of Medco’s commercial director is that the 
supply-side of the bio-pharma market may become more concentrated in the hands of a few 
major players that offer the same type of product whilst much smaller firms supply new 
product development, with R&D activities in the healthcare industry increasingly fragmented 
along the physical and financial value chain. Large players focus on “development” activities, 
whereas smaller players focus on “research” activities. Moreover, a market for corporate 
control over small research firms has emerged.    
 
Another important development in the industry in the last 10 years concerns the nature of 
competition when most of the large companies in this sector produced essentially similar 
product. To quote the Medco commercial director: 
 
‘The value of a blood test has been dropped down to (the value of) a commodity. A 
liver function test, a bio culture test, they’re a fraction of the price they used to be.... 
The suppliers to the market have allowed the customers (i.e. the hospitals and doctors) 
to dictate the price.’ 
 
Competition was not restricted only to the price of the tests, but extended also to the testing 
instruments themselves. Customers would buy an instrument from such big names as Abbott, 
Johnson & Johnson, Roche or Siemens so that price became the focus of competition rather 
than brand name. There is now an excess of both R&D and manufacturing capacity in the 
sector. However, in the view of the Medco commercial director, this situation has become 
unsustainable because companies cannot continue to develop new technology unless they 
manage to recover their initial investment. To quote the Medco commercial director on the 
subject: 
 
‘You invest...a hundred million (pounds) in developing a new clinical analyser (but) 
people aren’t going to do a hundred million pounds worth of new tests. You’re going 
to do the same tests whether they do it on an old machine or a new machine. You 
can’t create blood tests out of thin air.’ 
 
Against such a background, where Medco can add value is in the development of new disease 
markers. Markers become valuable when a new test has the potential to allow the doctor or 
 clinician to switch from one expensive therapy that is not going to work to another (possibly 
cheaper) therapy that will. 
 
4.2. Medco: the company 
 
Medco was formed in the late 1990s as the result of the merger of one company based in 
Swindon and another firm located in the South East, which had floated on the stock exchange 
four year earlier. The rationale for the merger was that the two companies, previously 
competitors, might more profitably merge and become financially stronger. Originally, the 
South Eastern firm had started business as a spin-off from a local university. According to the 
Medco website, the company finds itself currently at a transition stage in that early in its 
history, the focus was on R&D, with heavy investment in this area. At that time, the firm was 
loss making whereas now Medco is profitable and entering a “commercialization phase”, 
with a focus on sales & marketing and manufacturing growth. The shift into 
commercialization has been reinforced by the acquisition of a distribution company in a key 
European market in late 2007 and accounted for at fair value (market value) in Medco’s 
accounts. This acquisition has extended Medco’s distribution channels for its products.  
 
R&D in Medco is about expanding the menu of diagnostic tests they offer in the point of care 
market but these products must be commercialized and manufacturing and marketing strategy 
is now focused on achieving a significant increase in manufacturing volumes. Medco 
employs roughly 450 employees of which 150 are employed in the South East. 
 
 
4.3. The structure and process of the R&D activity within Medco 
 
In the past, the majority of research was carried out in Swindon, but the position has since 
reversed so that most is now done in the South East. The R&D Director of Lab division in the 
South East is in charge of 25 scientists and 3 managers including Owen, who covers OEM 
products and works mainly with Medco’s largest customer, predominantly on the 
development side of Medco’s business. Another manager covers reagents whilst the third, 
Charles, works on new markers and so is tasked with developing the intellectual property (IP) 
of the company. Charles has three scientists working with him and, in turn, each scientist 
manages a team of researchers. The hope is that the technology that Charles is working on 
 will, in time, feed through into new products. Charles works on a variety of projects, his 
specific brief being to investigate new markers for disease and the accompanying 
technologies. Medco operates in a highly regulated industry requiring detailed control of 
laboratory working practices and so where, the research and development process in the firm 
is long and convoluted. R&D is often initiated outside Medco, either in a university or a 
hospital, with these institutions undertaking clinical studies to explore the feasibility of new 
ideas for markers. After these clinical studies are completed results are then published, for 
review, by the medical profession who are not always receptive, given that they are also 
generally swamped with advertising and promotional material from the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
Medco has an internal group scanning the environment for new ideas for markers. They are 
frequently contacted by outsiders with ideas some of which need to be evaluated from a 
commercial and a technical point of view. If there is a possibility that a new product could be 
commercially attractive, Medco will undertake clinical trials. In addition to longer-term R&D 
projects, Medco also needs to work on shorter-term products to maintain an on-going 
portfolio. Short-term projects are defined as being 4-5 years in gestation and as usually 
involving the development of tests that will fit onto different but existing systems. The R&D 
function is constrained by both market and financial imperatives, Charles commenting: 
 
‘One of the problems with research is that it is very easy to drift. That there’s always 
one more experiment you can do...the scientist in you always wants to do that.’ 
 
He continues: 
 
‘The science might be fascinating but ...we’re not here just as academics. We are here 
to make money at the end of the day.’ 
 
Projects, often interesting from a purely scientific perspective will be cancelled if they do not 
promise a commercial return. Decisions to either continue or discontinue projects would 
normally rest with the main board members including the Lab division R&D director, the 
chief scientific officer, and depending on the project, the CEO.  
 
 One of the three R&D managers, Owen, is involved in the development of new products, 
taking them through from the research phase to what he terms ‘on-market.’ All of the 
products he is involved with are tests for automated systems, developing assays mostly for 
Medco’s main customer. Company strategy is now to diversify whilst at the same time, 
taking advantage of opportunities offered by this main customer. Consequently, Owen talks 
about the need to balance the company portfolio of products into high-risk high returns and 
medium risk medium returns, as they go through the development process. Lab division in 
general tends to be seen as a cash-cow which generates the returns necessary to keep the 
Atlas development program going. 
 
Owen talks of the pressures to deliver new products on time, with expectations as to launch 
incorporated into financial forecasts in terms of the timing of sales of new products. The 
R&D budget is constructed by the Lab R&D director but there is a lot of uncertainty because 
it is difficult to predict what projects will be in place in a year’s time. Often the exact budget 
is not clear-cut in that detail will be progressively filled in and, in the meantime, the focus 
will be on controlling the size of department, staff and raw materials costs.  When the launch 
date is so important, intermediate milestones need to be in place including, for example, that 
a particular assay is meeting its performance requirements. Owen feels that there is a greater 
stress now on reaching such milestones than there was when the company was in the initial 
start up phase roughly ten years ago. This is especially important when the useful patent life 
of products is reduced and where some of Medco’s earlier products are coming out of patent 
in the next few years. To quote the Medco commercial director: 
 
‘There’s always going to be a need for new products, new markers. I think when that 
stops...also remember that we’ve got this situation where the product X business is 
going to come to an end at some point.’  
 
In terms of key indicators the commercial director’s attention is focused on top line sales and 
profitability, with credit control rarely being an issue as customers, particularly the big 
companies, have tended to pay on time. Metrics such as the percentage of sales arising from 
new products, common in highly innovative firms are also not used because Medco only 
launches a few new markers each year.  
 
 The commercial director who is on the main board, joined the company in 2007, and was 
brought in to lead the firm towards a more sales & marketing focused strategy.  
 
‘I was brought in here to change the sort of sales and marketing outlook....(Medco) 
marketing tended to have been more scientific support....the idea was that we needed 
to take a different approach.’ 
He continues: 
 
‘My perception of the company when I first came here was one of a group of people 
who weren’t necessarily talking to one another, didn’t necessarily have a common 
goal. So I have been involved a lot with them trying to get alignment across the 
organisation and put in a (balanced) scorecard matrix.’ 
 
He further comments that when he joined Medco, there was an understanding of tasks that 
needed to be done but not of how these related to the business objectives of the company. In 
order to facilitate such understanding, he introduced a balanced scorecard within the part of 
the business located in the South East. The top level of the scorecard gives budgeted turnover 
and profitability targets to be reached in the Lab division. In order to reach these targets, 
assumptions about particular product launch dates for the Lab division are built into these 
estimates. To this end, the commercial director works with the company accountant, on the 
phasing of income and expenditure and the underlying assumptions in the budget. These 
assumptions then percolate down to the sales and marketing scorecard and that for R&D. 
Partly, as a result of introducing the balanced scorecard the commercial director believes that 
there is now a heightened level of understanding that if a product is not launched by the target 
date, then the organization will not meet its budget. 
 
The R&D manager, Owen, comments on the effort that has gone into implementing the 
balanced scorecard and in reinforcing its effectiveness, including linkage to the bonus 
scheme: 
 
‘Well a lot of effort’s gone into that (i.e. implementing the balanced scorecard) –
basically the management team now meets on a monthly basis to review it and update 
it so it is a living document – we have been using a very simple colour coding scheme 
– green means it’s probably on target, red definitely means we definitely won’t and 
 orange we are somewhere in between and that is then communicated to staff on a 
monthly basis as well and in a newsletter, which gets in turn backed up by staff 
meetings and in addition to that we have quarterly all site meetings....so there is quite 
a strong emphasis on the involvement of staff in this so that they understand what 
business needs are, and how we’re going to get to them and it is also links into the site 
bonus scheme we have here as well.’ 
 
Although Medco is R&D- driven, it is also clear that there are emerging pressures to ensure 
that research work converts into commercial product that both recover expenses and make a 
profit. This change in perspective is captured in the quote below from Medco’s company 
accountant. In an earlier period R&D was a key yardstick on which to base a stock market 
valuation with profits part of a long-term project. Now the object is to make a profit for 
shareholders especially after the dot com boom.  
 
‘We are, I suppose, a bit akin to the dot com bubble.  Bio-pharma was also seen as a 
blockbuster for the future so a lot of our share price value was driven on the basis of 
future profits but in the climate since (the) dot com bubble burst it’s the shareholders 
are looking for real value as opposed to a theoretical value  based on the dot com 
affair.  So yes it’s important that we do achieve profitability and in the long term 
make a return to investors.  It was seen at one time that a high level of R&D 
expenditure was a good thing- what we had (for) the size of the company was quite 
phenomenal really.’ 
 
‘I mean we were probably worth at that stage, our absolute level of R&D hasn’t 
changed that much as a total of proportion spend, it was very, very high and that was 
seen as a good thing because it was all based on this future perception of growth but 
now it’s not so much now as people are looking for real returns now...I would think 
it probably changed about four years ago, something like that.  I mean it was a knock 
on effect from the dot com (bubble).’ 
 
It is the company accountant’s view that investors are now looking for ‘real returns’ in 
contrast to in the recent past. Feng et al (2001) draw attention to the dual standard operating 
during the dot.com boom where start-ups were provided with IPO (initial placement offer) 
and follow on investment funding on the promise of future returns. This was in stark contrast 
 to the “old economy” business model that required firms to generate 12-15 per cent return on 
capital employed to secure investment.  
 
Referring to the current changed market conditions facing the firm, the R&D director 
comments that whilst Medco spends a large proportion of its income on R&D, it is working 
hard to communicate how R&D converts into commercial income.  
 
‘I think this was the problem we had with the marketplace, just seeing us as a heavy 
spender in R&D and this is the message we’re putting out now is that we’ve done a 
lot of the R&D and now we are commercializing it all and that’s okay. But we still 
need to keep R&D going because otherwise we won’t have a future.’ 
 
The commercial director revealed that investor analyst reports are left in the company 
canteen so that all employees are potentially aware of Medco’s share price and of City 
expectations. To quote the commercial director: 
 
‘Yeah, I think I’ve certainly noticed the difference coming from my previous 
employer to Medco… in terms of the analysts’ reports that are in the canteen...when 
everybody hears about the share price. What will the City think of this? I think there 
is a very strong focus on what will the City think? What will the shareholders think? 
And I guess you would expect that in a company like Medco...’ 
 
Internal communications about performance play an important role in connecting R&D, 
income, profit and company valuation, and employee bonuses reinforce the linkage.  
The commercial director also provides “good stories” for an external audience especially the 
analysts that make “buy, sell or hold” recommendations on the firm’s stock.  
 
‘The pressures that there are don’t stop us doing what we are doing but you’ve always 
got to be thinking.... ‘how will this be perceived?’ ...so I believe by doing that (driving 
product sales and helping increase profitability), I actually create the good stories to 
send back to the marketplace.’  
 
Charles, one of the research managers, is aware of financial pressures especially the 
significance of announcing good or bad R&D outcomes which 
   
‘....can have quite an effect on the share price for example, announcements that are 
made, either good or bad.’ 
 
In terms of managing such information communicated to financial markets, another senior 
manager, Fred, tends to get involved in ensuring that the correct scientific message is 
provided to financial institutions.  
 
The company accountant observes that institutional investors have so far not placed Medco 
under too much pressure but the firm will have to perform in the next couple of years. 
  
‘I don’t think there have been many pressures, particularly from any of the 
institutional investors from the States because we are probably at quite an exciting 
stage of development.... we’ve got to perform for the next couple of years.’ 
 
Significantly, the R&D work has been done and Medco needs to commercialize this and earn 
a return on the investment. 
 
‘I mean to achieve profitability for three years, that is the launching pad if you like for 
the growth, all these things that have been incurred, the hard work has been done. 
Now we have since moved over to a commercialization phase so our sales & 
marketing people have to get out there and sell.’ 
 
‘We’ve got to deliver (on promises)...we’ve got a little while. But there will be 
pressures I’m sure (later).’ 
 
 
The R&D Director, comments: 
 
‘Good science and no sales.  There’s no point in having the best product in the world 
if you can’t sell it so that whole philosophy that’s changed. We’re a commercial 
company and that’s developed...  I respect that shareholders are looking to get their 
money back, looking for a return. If we don’t they’ll take their money out and invest it 
somewhere else.’ 
  
The R&D manager, Charles also notes 
 
‘The science might be fascinating but ...we’re not here just as academics. We are here 
to make money at the end of the day.’ 
 
 
Conditions have changed for Medco since it started life as a spin-off of the research arm of a 
university located in the South East. The culture of the organization changed from an 
academic research driven start-up to a commercially driven business with appointed 
managers some of whom had come from larger pharmaceutical companies such as GSK and 
Abbott Labs. In 2007, a new marketing director hired to change company culture introduced 
the balanced scorecard into Lab division in the South East with a host of related measures, 
including linking financial outcomes to the site bonus scheme. Within the firm at large, there 
is a recognition that Medco has to deliver on its past promises to the financial markets. 
Maintaining R&D spend is a central objective, both because this would help reduce Medco’s 
reliance on its major customer as well as introducing new products in view of the imminent 
expiry of the product X patent in 2013. To quote the commercial director: 
 
‘We have a lot of our business is built upon the back of product X. We get a lot of 
royalties from product X but our patent expires in 2013 so that’s going to make a big 
hole in the business of 2013.’ 
 
In the following section we reveal the extent to which high R&D intensity has delivered 
strong financial performance and the extent to corporate governance has become 
financialized in Medco. 
 
5. Medco: financial performance 2003-2007  
 
Medco is an R&D intensive business recycling an average 16% of total revenues into R&D 
over the period 2003-2007, a commitment that is ten times greater than the average of the 
FTSE100 R&D-active group of firms. (Here R&D-active firms are defined as encompassing 
those FTSE100 firms which engage in any reported R&D expenditure). For the period 2003-
2007 Medco reinvested three-quarters of cash generated from operations into capital 
 expenditure and R&D. This is equivalent to two-thirds of all external and internal funding 
raised. It is possible to describe companies as being “productionist” or “financialized” 
(Andersson et al 2007) where firms devote, more or less, financial resources into innovation 
and productive renewal.  In the period 2003-2007, Medco maintained a high level of 
investment into R&D and productive renewal suggesting that ‘productionist’ governance was 
a priority rather than downsize and distribute (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 
 
        Figure 1: Medco: R&D and Capital Expenditure in Sales (%) 
 
Source: Medco Annual Report 2003-2007 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that over a relatively short period of time the reinvestment rate in 
R&D and capital expenditure has slowed relative to the growth in sales revenue as shown in 
Figure 1. Our argument is that this may reflect a re-orientation in governance and strategic 
priority. Before we turn to explore the extent to which Medco is shifting its strategic 
emphasis towards the financialization of governance and strategy, we first consider the extent 
to which a high R&D innovation-led policy is delivering above average performance. 
 
R&D spend and investment in additional productive and distribution capacity extended sales 
revenues by more than 35% over the period 2003 to 2007 but this growth rate was not 
exceptional. For example, Figure 2 below plots Medco sales growth against that of the FTSE 
100 group of R&D active firms. 
 
 
  
 
Source: Thomson One Banker 
 
Medco operates with sales revenue of under £100 million and employment of around 450 
staff (in 2007) and given the firm’s size we have chosen to benchmark it against the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) group of companies. Our analysis profiles key 
financial operating ratios of 500 AIM listed firms where we have 5 years of financial data for 
the period 2003 to 2007. The key financial ratios employed to benchmark the performance of 
Medco use a nature of expenses rather than function of expense approach (see Andersson et 
al 2008). Starting with the revenue side we deconstruct performance to reveal how much 
revenue is employed to cover external and then internal costs (such as employee expenses) 
leaving a residual of cash and profit from operations. We then combine this analysis with 
rates of capitalization (debt and equity) employed to generate a unit of cash or profit per unit 
of capital employed (Andersson et al, 2007, 2008). 
 
 
We start by considering the share of total sales revenue retained in Medco after paying out all 
external expenses to suppliers and providers of services. As shown in Figure 3 below, Medco 
progressively increased the share of revenue it retains from the financial value chain from 27 
to 43 percent so that for every unit of sales revenue over half is retained in Medco compared 
to the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) average of roughly 28 percent. 
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Figure 2: Sales Growth Medco and FTSE 100  (2003-2007)
 Figure 3: Value Retention as Percentage of Sales 
 
Source: Medco Annual Report 2003-2007 and Thomson One Banker 
 
We now turn to consider the share of value retained which is distributed to remunerate 
employee employment including social charges. Medco operates with a high labour costs 
share of value retained in its start-up phase distributing more than 100% of value retained to 
cover employee compensation in 2003. As in Figure 4 below, by 2007 Medco distributed 
roughly three-quarters of value retained to its employees, a similar figure to the average AIM 
listed company. 
 
This combination of both a higher share of income retained and a similar share of labour 
costs in revenue enabled Medco to generate a higher share of cash resources from its 
operations as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) relative 
to the average AIM listed company. 
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Source: Medco Annual Report 2003-2007 and Thomson One Banker 
 
Figure 5: Cash as a Percentage of Sales 
 
Source: Medco Annual Report 2003-2007 and Thomson One Banker 
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Figure 4: Labour Cost in Value Retained (%) 
 After a start up phase when cash from operations is negative, Figure 5 above shows that 
Medco’s share of cash extracted out of sales revenue increases to just over 10% compared to 
the AIM average of 7%. A significant bottom line ratio is the Cash ROCE that includes 
balance sheet capitalization (long-term debt and shareholder equity).  The cash ROCE also 
figures in key shareholder value metrics that use a combination of cash / capital employed in 
their computation. Froud et al (2006) argue that it is possible for companies to under perform 
in ROCE terms relative to what is seen as a shareholder value norm, for example their case 
study of General Electric reveals that underperformance in terms of ROCE may still be 
rewarded favorably by the market. Anderson et al 2008 observe that the ROCE is both a 
product of value creating moves (cash extracted per financial unit of capital employed) and 
also value absorbing moves (merger and acquisitions) which are accounted for at market 
value often inflating balance sheet capitalization ahead of cash earnings.   
 
Figure 6: Cash ROCE % 
 
Source: Medco Annual Report 2003-2007 and Thomson One Banker 
 
Although Medco starts off with favourable operating costs structures which release a higher 
share of revenues as cash (EBITDA), this does not translate into a higher cash ROCE because 
Medco’s capital intensity (balance sheet capital employed per unit of sales revenue) is above 
the AIM average.  Medco, whilst an R&D intensive company, is not able to translate this 
commitment into an above average bottom line cash return on capital employed which is a 
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 key shareholder value metric as shown in Figure 6. In this specific case there does not seem 
to be a straightforward linkage between R&D intensity and above average return on capital 
for shareholders.  
 
Evidence taken from Medco’s annual report and accounts facilitates the construction of an 
alternative financialized account of corporate governance and strategic priority.   Our 
argument is that financialization is directing governance and strategy in Medco because the 
objective of driving up cash earnings and stock market valuation feeds back into directors’ 
medium and long-term compensation and bonus arrangements. To grow cash earnings and 
market value from the commercialization of Medco’s products required the company to 
acquire distribution capacity. This transaction (the purchase of another company) accounted 
for at fair (market) value required managers to absorb the market value of the deal. In this 
account of financialization directing Medco’s governance and strategy, capital market claims 
are modifying stakeholder settlements.  
 
We start with directors’ compensation and bonuses. Medco’s remuneration report discloses 
that directors receive a basic fee but that they are also paid a cash bonus where certain 
financial and non-financial targets are met. 
 
“Objectives for 2007 put emphasis on superior performance against budgeted profit 
before tax on a Group and Divisional basis and for the Chief Executive Officer and 
the Finance Director, the Company’s relative share price performance” 
 
This bonus payment is subject to a limit of a maximum of 60 percent of annual basic salaries. 
In the financial year ended 2007 the directors of Medco received £2m in basic fees and 
bonuses (of which bonuses were £0.25m). This payment to directors was the equivalent of 
over 50 % of profits earned and nearly one-quarter of the total R&D expense in 2007. 
Payments to directors do account for a substantial proportion of profit and to cross-check, we 
ranked the top ten AIM listed bio-pharmas by their market value and computed the total 
profit/loss of these firms in 2007. Many start-up bio-pharma firms are loss making (like 
Medco in an earlier period) and this group of ten bio-pharma companies incurred losses 
amounting £23 million in 2007. Directors’ fees and bonuses for this group accounted for one 
third of losses again suggesting that in small to medium start-up companies the emoluments 
and bonuses of directors constitute a substantial financial commitment out of profit and loss. 
 In addition to their fees, Medco directors have been issued with stock options subject to the 
following conditions: 
 
» earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)  
must be positive for at least the two financial years immediately prior to 
exercise and; 
 
» EBITDA per share, once positive, should achieve growth which exceeds the 
percentage growth in the Retail Price Index by 4% or more. In addition, the 
growth in the Company’s share price between date of grant and at least one 
day during the option period must put it in the top third of companies which 
comprise the All Share Health Index. 
 
 
The number of stock options outstanding and issued to directors was equivalent to 4% 
(slightly below the AIM average of 6%) of outstanding share capital with a market value of 
£5m of as at the year-end 2007. 
 
The commercialization strategy at Medco has involved a number of acquisitions totaling 
roughly £7 million in 2007, which has improved the firm’s distribution capacity. In 
financialized accounts, Andersson et al (2008) argue that the switch from historic cost 
(pooling of assets) to ‘fair value’ business combination reporting reflects the increasingly 
dominant interests of shareholder stakeholders. Corporate-capital market transactions are now 
‘marked to market’ in the balance sheet to reflect the current market value of the enterprise to 
shareholders. Medco’s acquisition was accounted for at fair value using the purchase method 
in line with the International Accounting Standards Board (ISAB) regulation on accounting 
for business combinations. 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/73E562FE-F581-4DD4-8365-B17E228955C9/0/IFRS3.pdf 
 
Mark to market accounting tends to deflate reported cash ROCE because balance sheet values 
inflate ahead of cash earnings when the cash earnings of the acquired company remain 
relatively untransformed but balance sheet values are inflated to their market value. Medco’s 
acquisition resulted in the company absorbing the market value of assets where the value of 
goodwill on acquisition (the difference between market and book value) lodged in the 
balance sheet was equivalent to 20 per cent of Medco’s total assets employed. In addition to 
the impact on reported cash ROCE, goodwill is no longer annually amortized but is subject to 
 a “goodwill impairment test”. Were product market conditions to deteriorate, goodwill 
impairments could undermine reported profits.  
 
Financialization is directing strategy at Medco because incentives (bonuses and stock 
options) modify the management of corporate resources and governance around arbitrage for 
value creation and absorption (Andersson et al, 2008). Medco has yet to make dividend 
payments to shareholders but institutional shareholders, during the current credit crisis may 
modify their demands. If dividends were to be paid this would unsettle the existing pattern of 
stakeholder claims, forcing senior executives to extract additional cash out of operations and 
increase available free cash resources for distribution.  
 
Moreover, Medco is currently operating a defined benefit (DB) pension scheme where 
employees are entitled to a pension based on their final salary. Most DB pension schemes 
will have a certain proportion of their investments in share capital (Medco currently has 20% 
of pension assets invested in equities) and during the bull market, holding gains inflated the 
value of pension fund assets. Many DB schemes were in surplus during the 1990s and often 
firms could take a pension holiday. In the current bear market the value of stocks (FTSE100, 
S&P500) are down 30% January 2008 to December 2008. At the end of the financial year 
2007, Medco reported a pension shortfall because liabilities (claims) exceeded the valuation 
of assets (the value of pension investments) by roughly £3m. In the financial year 20007 
Medco included a charge of £1.0 m (and in 2006 £1.5m) against profit to provide for the 
difference between pension fund assets and liabilities. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Medco is a case study of an R&D intensive start-up operating under financialization and 
reflects how the demands of shareholders in an era of shareholder value become internalized 
aligning managerial and shareholder interests. Froud et al (2006) observe that financialization 
is about the discrepancy between narratives employed to exaggerate claims about improved 
performance to help boost stock prices and managerial pay and the financial numbers which 
are often not transformed.  
 
In its development stage, Medco’s R&D culture was the product of being a spin out from a  
South Eastern University where the object was to develop ideas and publish in academic 
 journals. This R&D driven culture of experimentation, innovation and knowledge 
development was still present in Medco in 2008 but these values had been diluted by a 
managerial culture with its emphasis on commercialization and cost effectiveness, cash 
earnings and pay for performance. R&D does still matter in Medco but those who talked to us 
about R&D suggested that R&D must pay for itself and help generate returns to shareholders. 
The R&D function (expense) is wired into budgets that set out the physical and financial 
objectives, budgets also embodying financial incentives that connect employee pay to 
(shareholder value) performance.  R&D is also about communicating “good news” to 
analysts to influence their opinions, confidence and ultimately the share price.   
 
This article employs financial numbers to construct an alternative argument that R&D (on its 
own) may not be sufficient to deliver strong corporate financial performance and that the link 
between R&D and financial performance is not that straightforward. These results align with 
the findings of the Froud et al (2006) Glaxo case where, the authors argue that high R&D 
expenditure does not necessarily underwrite robust financials. Responses from our 
interviewees revealed some of the tensions and contradictions, for example, that Medco often 
struggled to get new product into the market quickly enough and how delay could eat into the 
effective patent period. Moreover, even before patent expiry, intense product market 
competition and the commodification of diagnostic tests damaged cash and profit margins.  
 
Our analysis of the numbers from Medco’s published report and accounts revealed that 
financial performance is not exceptional when referenced to the average AIM listed firm. 
Medco is caught between powerful customers, competitors and vagaries of the capital market 
all of which make the connection between R&D intensity and robust shareholder value 
financials less straightforward.  Our argument is that financialization is directing corporate 
governance and strategy in Medco and one key element of this is how narratives about R&D 
in progress and completed are deployed to boost market valuation in the absence of above 
average performance.  
 
Other elements include a directors’ remuneration package that wires managerial and staff 
bonuses into shareholder value metrics. In Medco senior executive pay was directly linked to 
boosting the cash earnings per share and the market value of the company and it is 
noteworthy that the share of profit distributed is significant. Directors’ fees were equivalent 
to more than half of annual net profit and one quarter of annual R&D, and accumulated stock 
 options had a market value of £5 million. Having reviewed a sample of ten bio-pharmas 
(ranked by market value) listed on AIM we find that directors’ fees, do account for a 
significant share of company profit and loss.  
 
To extend market reach Medco acquired other firms but these corporate acquisitions were 
accounted for at market value and this helped to inflate balance sheet capitalization ahead of 
cash earnings, thereby eroding corporate earnings capacity (cash ROCE). In our account of 
an R&D intensive firm under financialization we observe that managers are struggling to 
both deliver value creating moves and absorb market value for shareholders. Mark to market 
accounting forces firms to reflect the market value of capital market transactions in the 
balance sheet. When asset markets are inflating the market value of a firm generally runs 
ahead of cash earnings and when such a firm is subsequently absorbed by the acquiring firm 
this acts to depress the consolidated reported ROCE. Alternatively, a bear market forces firms 
to recognize holding losses, for example, as pension fund liabilities run ahead of the market 
value of assets. 
 
What can we conclude from the Medco case with regards to R&D-intensive firms under 
financialization? Firstly, we do need to be cautious about drawing generalizations from a 
specific case study. It is possible that SME bio-pharmas, are operating along different 
trajectories and responding variably to stakeholders and the demands of the product and 
capital market. However, this case study does open up a series of questions that we believe 
require further investigation. To what extent are R&D intensive SME firms able to translate 
innovation and new product development into above average financial performance and 
robust business models? Have the patterns of cash distribution shifted over time in R&D 
intensive SME’s towards shareholders at the expense of capital investment and productive 
renewal?  Is there a culture of high pay with a high proportion of profit distributed to 
directors in R&D intensive SMEs?  
 
Our financialized account of corporate governance and strategy at Medco revealed how 
narratives deployed to talk up the financial promise of R&D are at variance with alternative 
narratives constructed out of the financial numbers. These alterative account(s) reveal a less 
than straightforward connection between R&D intensity and financial performance for 
Medco. The process of constructing a financialized account using the firms reported 
financials reveals how financial outcomes are the product of a complex matrix of transactions 
 arising out of product, procurement, labour and capital market interventions. From this 
financialized perspective, contradiction and ambiguities frustrate straightforward connectivity 
as between R&D as input and financial performance as output. This perspective contrasts 
with the ‘productionist’ centered views (DCMS, 1998, 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000, 
2004; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) which assume a more straightforward and less ambiguous 
connection between R&D, corporate financial performance and national economic 
competitiveness.   
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